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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELSA B. MICHAEL, and BEVERLY 
S. CLENDENIN and ELSA B. 
MICHAEL, 
Trustees of a trust for the use and 
benefit of HELEN B. BEHAL, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
SALT LAKE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, an expired Utah 
corporation, and Salt Lake 
Investment Company, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9034 
This is an action to quiet title, brought by plaintiff-
respondents to quiet their title against the defendants~ap­
pellants to lots numbered 22 through 27 in Folsom's 
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Addition, in North Salt Lake, Salt Lake County, Utah 
(Rec. 1-3) . Respondents further allege continuow, 
notorious, exclusive adverse possession of said premises and 
each and every part thereof for over twenty years (Com-
plaint, page 2, Rec. 2), but did not allege against whom 
said alleged adverse possession was maintained for said 
period. 
Appellants-defendants claim under a tax deed issued 
September 22nd, 1909 by the Salt Lake County Auditor, 
which tax deed was based on sale for delinquent 1896 taxes, 
sold to M. C. Moon and the sale certificate assigned to 
Salt Lake Investment Company (Complaint, paragraph 
2, page 2, Rcc. 2; Answer, first part second defense, Rec. 
4; Exhibit "8"; Page 24, page 11, of Exhibit "I"). 
In support of the claim of respondent-plaintiffs' 
allegations of adverse possession, H. L. Balser, one of their 
witnesses, testified that from 1917 onward to about 1935 
(Tr. 10, Rec. 23, Tr. 14, Rec. 27) the lots in question 
were used as a storage yard for railroad ties of the Bam-
berger Railroad (who was not an owner or in the chain 
of title) under an oral permit or license. Witness had no 
knowledge of the exact bounds of the lots as same were 
not staked on the ground (T r. 21, Rec. 34), and, an ad-
jacent street called Chestnut Street, and, an alley, were 
not specifically delineated either (Tr. 20, Rec. 33, Tr. 21, 
Rec. 34.) further, the property in question was there-
after included in a lease to Wendell Wagstaff, following 
closely on the conclusion of the tie storage situation, said 
lease being an oral lease (Tr. 37, Rec. 50), but which was 
not included in the written lease until about April 16th, 
1949 (Exhibit 5). The lessee used the parts of the 
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ground for bulk oil storage and transfer to smaller con-
tainers, and later for some salvage storage and sorting of 
war surplus items (Tr. 17, Rec. 30, Tr. 18, Rec. 31). 
Rental was collected from the Wagstaff people, but it 
was not separately itemized or stated as to the particular 
lots involved in this suit, but covered the rental on other 
ground, not in question here, as well (Tr. 22, Rec. 35, Tr. 
32, Rec. 45). The area has since been used as a parking lot 
for lessee's tankers, and the tankers of lessee'~ customers 
(Tr. 27, Rec. 40), and is an open area, which has had some 
gravel placed upon it (T r. 2 5, Rec. 3 8) , and is unfenced 
(Tr. 23, Rec. 36, Tr. 24, Rec. 37). 
Another of plainiff-appellants' witnesses, Donald 
H. \\;'agstaff, testified as to alleged usages of the ground 
from the initiation of his lease, in first putting a two to 
three inch pipeline across lots 22, 23, and 24 (Tr. 42, 
Rec. 55) placing oil storage drums and filling smaller 
containers from the drums (Tr. 42, Rec. 55), together 
with some U'>agc by his transports or trucks (T r. 53, Rec. 
56), conducting a salvage operation on used government 
materials, bailing and disposing of same (Tr. 50, Rcc. 63-
Tr. 62, Rcc. 65), and later making a parking lot of much 
of the area (Tr. 54, Rec. 67-Tr. 63, Rcc. 76). Plain-
tiffs and respondents, paid all taxes since 1957, and prior 
taxes were paid by the Simon Bamberger Company back 
to 1924 (Tr. 16, 17, Rec. 29, 30, Exhibit "6"). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
FINDINGS OF FACT MUST NOT BE BARE CON-
CLUSIONS. 
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POINT II 
RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION INSUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH LAW. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS' 1906 TAX DEED 
WAS INVALID BOTH AS TO FORM AND IN LAW. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS AS COTENANT$ ARE UNAFFECTED 
BY RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENTS MUST RECOVER ON STRENGTH 
OF THEIR OWN TITIE, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FINDINGS OF FACT MUST NOT BE BARE CON-
CLUSIONS: 
Plaintiff-respondents' findings of fact in paragraph 
I (Rec. 90-91) "conclude" that "plaintiffs are the legal 
tide holders of the realty described," and in paragraphs 
5 and 6(Rec. 92) again "conclude" that the acts of occu-
pancy of plaintiff-respondents were "open, notorious, 
hostile, adverse, continuous and exclusive as to all persons, 
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5 
including defendants" and was for the "ordinary use" of 
the occupant. 
Such statements, are not, within the rules applicable 
to findings of fact as used in this jurisdiction, acceptable 
forms for, or findings of actual, material facts, but are 
mere bald conclusions of law, and, to the extent that the 
decree rests or purports to rest- upon them, cannot be 
predicated on such findings. 
The general rule as to findings of fact is well stated 
in 53 American Jurisprudence, Section 113 8, on page 794, 
as follows: 
"Propositions which are in reality conclusions 
of law cannot be given effect as findings [of fact] 
even though included with findings of fact ..... " 
Utah rules relative to the above are well stated in the 
following excerpts from case~: 
[9-10] The findings of the court that the shares 
of stock transferred .... were transferred in con-
templation of the death of decedent and not to 
take effect until at or after his death, being found 
merely in the language of the statute, ...... are 
mere conclusions of law without any facts found 
to support them. Our statute, requires the facts 
found and the conclusions of law to be separately 
stated and unless that is done and all material facts 
found as disclosed by the evidence which in the 
judgment of the court and counsel have a bearing 
on the question as to what that judgment should 
be, nothing more is accomplished than by a mere 
general verdict, and the wholesome purpose of the 
statute aforesaid requiring findings and conclusions 
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to be separately found and stated [is thwarted] 
..... Real requirement of the statute is just as 
essential in equity a~ in law cases. A judgment 
rendered on no findings, or not upon sufficient or 
proper findlngs to support it, has no more validity 
in equity than in law."- In Rc Thompson's Es-
tate, 269 Pac 103,72 Utah 35, at page 109 Pacific. 
" [ 2-3] It is obvious that the court did not find all 
the material issues raised by the complaint ..... 
The rule with respect to the making of findings 
which has been adopted and followed in this juris-
diction is stated in Dillon Implement Company vs 
Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 88 Pac. 670-1, as follows: 
'The law is well settled that the findings must be 
within the issues when compared with the plead-
ings and must respond to and cover the material 
issues raised by the pleadings ..... No judgment 
can properly be rendered until there is a finding 
upon all the material issues. See West vs. Standard 
Fuel Company (Utah), 17 Pac 2nd 291 (292).-
Thomas vs. Farrell, 26 Pac. 2d 328, 82 Utah 535, 
at pages 330-1. 
The above "conclusions" contained in the findings 
of fact, as such, as well as when considered in connection 
with the other facts of the case, and the arguments else-
where presented herein, cannot stand either as YJ!id 
findings of fact, nor, as being predicated upon any of the 
evidence adduced here. Being wholly unsupportable, 
they fall, and with them, the plaintiff-respondents' case. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION INSUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH LAW. 
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(A) No evidence in this case was adduced to show 
that there was any actual possession by the respondents 
or their predecessors during the period 1898-1917, or, 
indeed that respondents did anything in or upon the lots 
in question, at all, for this period of some 19 years. 
(B) The evidence as to the alleged "adverse" posses-
sion from 1917 to 1935, consists in the acts of a stranger 
to the title, the Bamberger Electric Railroad or the Bam-
berger Railroad Company, in storing tics on the lots, or 
parts of the lots in question. Certainly, under the rules 
laid down in Day vs. Steele, 184 Pac 2nd 216, Ill Utah, 
224, there was no "cultivation or improvement" of the 
land, it was not "enclosed", used for "fuel supply" or 
for "fencing timber", purposes of "husbandry", "pas-
turage', or, for the "ordinary use of the occupant" as that 
terms has been defined. Nothing in the acts of the 
railroad amounted to "adverse" possession, especiJ.Jly, since 
the ties were being stored all over the area, and on other 
lots belonging to the respondent-plaintiffs. 
(C) The usages of the lessees (\Wagstaffs) of the 
property from 1935 onward did not constitute "improve-
ments", as they put nothing en which were changes of a 
"substantial" or "permanent" nature, and such as remained 
visible for the period of the claimed statute of limitations. 
Nor docs the ''ordinary use of the occupant" help in this 
instance, either, for the alleged uses were temporary plac-
ing of oil storage drums, salvage material, and later usc 
for parking lot for transient customer trucks. These 
usages, when considered in the light that adjacent property 
was being used likewise by the lessees for the same pur-
pose, may be considered a mere "overflow" onto these 
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lots, such as any and many persons do, as where there is 
vacant adjacent ground onto which they can encroach. 
Certainly, nothing in the usages mentioned, are such as 
to indicate a manifest intention on the part of plaintiff-
respondents to oust defendant-appellants, and, certainly, 
are not compatible with a claim of exclusive, adverse, 
hostile, possession, as against all the world. These usages 
are no more adverse than was the usage in Perry Estate 
vs Ford, 46 Utah 346, 151 Pac. 59, where leaving wagons, 
and throwing refuse, even coupled with payment of 
taxes, was insufficient to establish adverse possession. 
The mentioned portion of findings l, 5, 6, cannot be 
sustained or supported on the basis of the actual evidence 
relating to the alleged adverse possession, either in fact or 
in law. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSOR'S 1906 TAX DEED 
WAS INVALID BOTH IN FORM AND IN LAW. 
Plaintiff-respondents rely, in part at least, upon 
quit-claim deed from Salt Lake County to Simon Bam-
berger dated May 7th, 1906 (Exhibit "2", Page 23, Ex-
hibit "1"), based on tax sales apparently made in con-
nection with delinquencies for 1897-8, as being part of 
their title. They can place no reliance upon same, for it 
appears that the deed is of no effect. 
It appears from the abstract of tide (Exhibit 1, 
Page "11", and Ex:hibit "8") that there were outstanding 
taxes for the year 1896, prior to the the purported com-
missioners' sale resulting in the 1906 deed to Simon 
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Bamberger. Any such sale of land for subsequent taxes, 
while the prior tax is outstanding and unpaid, is improper, 
if not absolutely illegaL See the case of Board of Com'rs 
of Sedgwick County vs Connors ct a! 245, Pac. 1030, 121 
Kan. 105, wherein the Court stated: 
"In this case the county treasurer transcended his 
authority when he accepted money for the de-
linquent taxes of 1915, while at the same time he 
ignored the county's lien for the earlier delinquent 
taxes of 1914. 1'\o such prerogative is vested in the 
county treasurer". 
Nor was there any such prerogative vested in the 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County. And the 
court in the Sedgwick case, supra, properly noted that the: 
"whole matter of taxation, including the pow-
ers of the taxing authority to deal with property 
on which taxes are n<Jt paid, and to conserve the 
public's revenue affected thereby, is governed .... 
b " y statutes ..... 
Utah Laws of 1896, in the so-called Revenue Act, 
page 450, states: 
"Section 92: Every tax has the effect of a 
judgment against the person, and every lien created 
by this act has the force and effect of an execution 
duly levied against all personal property of the 
delinquent. The judgment is not satisfied nor the 
lien removed until the taxes are paid, or the prop-
erty sold for the payment thereof." 
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Certainly appellants' lien for the 1896 taxes con-
tinued in force, even after respondents' predecessors at-
tempted to take up the 1897-8 tax lien in 1906, and, when 
the property which is subject to this suit was sold in 1909, 
to appellants, then this lien was foreclosed, title of respon-
dents' predecessor divested, and such title vested in the ap-
pellant, where it remains, undisturbed and undivcsted. 
Section 146 of the Revenue Act of 1896 (Page 460, 
Laws Utah, 1896) provides that property shall be con-
tinued to be assessed after the first year's sale for taxes, 
but not to be sold again, while the redemption for the 
previous sale may be made. And Section 147 of the 
Revenue Act of 1896 (Page 460, Laws of Utah, 1896), 
provided no final sale under the law was to be made, 
in event there were (as here) unredeemed prior taxes, 
un!css exPressly permitted by the Board of [County] 
Commissioners. No authority for the final sale was 
shown here by virtue of any board order permitting 
the county to take title. 
Neither does the deed to Simon Bamberger dated 
May 7th, 1906, conform to the mandate of Section 123 
of the Revenue Act of 1896, (Page 456, Laws Utah, 
1896), in that it (Exhibit "8") fails to recite "substan-
tially the amount of the tax for which the property was 
sold, the year for which is was assessed, the day and 
year of sale, and the amount for which the real estate was 
sold." 
The quitclaim deed (Exhibit 8) to Simon Bamberger 
fails in both its legal effect, and in its form, and is mani-
festly invalid. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANTS AS COTENANTS ARE UNAFFECTED 
BY RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED ACTS OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION. 
Even conceding, momentarily, for the sake of argu-
ment, the validity of the 1906 tax deed to Simon Bam-
berger, the effect would be to make the appellant and 
respondents' predecessor, Mr. Bamberger, tenants in com-
mon in the lots in question, since, they were both holding 
tax deeds from the same taxing authority, and both of 
which deeds were on a parity as to their lien or foreclosure 
or conveyance rights. 
What rule is applicable under the cotenancy doc-
trine: Section 54 American Jurisprudence, Volume 1, 
Page 824, under title Adverse Possession states in part: 
"Since acts of ownership which in the case of 
a stranger would be deemed adverse, and appear as 
disseisin, are in cases of tenants in common sus-
ceptible of explanation consistently with the real 
title, they are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
unity of possession existing under a co-tenancy 
..... Accordingly, it is a general rule that the 
entry of a co-tenant on the common property, 
even if he takes the rents, cultivates the land, or 
cuts the wood and timber without accounting or 
pay for any share of it will not be generally con-
sidered as adverse to his cotcnants and an ouster of 
h , t eJil. • • • • • 
Utah has recognized the rule, in such situations a~ 
were present in McCready vs Fredrickson, 41 Utah, 388, 
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126 Pac. 316, where possession, fencing, usage, and pay-
ment of taxes were held insufficient to divest the co-
tenants' title. 
Under this theory standing alone, the plaintiff-re-
spondents failed to prove any adverse possession against 
defendants-appellants, entitling them to be awarded a 
decree, and clearly, the findings of the trial court are 
umupported by the evidence as to this situation. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENTS MUST RECOVER ON THE 
STRENGTH OF THEIR OWN TITLE. 
It is so well settled as to need no extensive citation, 
to determine that in a quiet title action of this character 
that the plaintiff should prevail, only on the basis of his 
own claim of title, whether by adverse possession or other-
wise, and, he must show a good title in himself to win, 
which the plaintiffs here, as hereinabove illustrated have 
failed to do, and not by showing any defects in the de-
fendants' title. See Home Owners Loan Corporation vs 
Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 Pac 2nd, 160. Here, all of 
the plaintiff-respondents' attacks on defendant-appel-
lants' title, do not suffice to bolster his own title by 
making it any better, and, since plaintiff-respondent has 
the burden of sustaining his contentions under these cir-
cumstances, it is submitted that in view of the situation 
herein created, there is a failure of proof as to sustain 
plaintiff-respondents' case. Defendant-appellants have 
shown that plaintiff-respondents have no basis for quiet-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
ing title, and therefore it was error for the trial court to 
have permitted a decree to be entered against defendant-
appellants herein. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted, that the de-
cision, findings, and decree of the trial court in favor of 
the plaintiff-respondents are erroneous, for the various 
reasons set out hereinabove in this brief, and, that the 
plaintiff-respondents having failed to sustain the burden 
of proof as to its contentions of adverse possession, its 
case or cause of action must fail, and a reversal of the trial 
court's findings, decision, and decree should be entered 
herein, with costs to this appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MIL TON V. BACKMAN, of 
Backman, Backman & Clark, 
Attorneys for Defemlanfs-
Appellallts, 
1111 Deseret Building, 
Salt Lake Gty 11, Utah 
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